By Timothy O'Connor
An expansive, but succinct, research of the Philosophy of faith – from metaphysics via theology. equipped into sections, the textual content first examines truths relating what's attainable and what's priceless. those chapters lay the root for the book’s moment half – the hunt for a metaphysical framework that enables the potential of an final rationalization that's right and complete.
- A state-of-the-art scholarly paintings which engages with the normal metaphysician’s quest for a real final rationalization of the main basic beneficial properties of the area we inhabit
- Develops an unique view in regards to the epistemology and metaphysics of modality, or truths pertaining to what's attainable or necessary
- Applies this framework to a re-assessment of the cosmological argument for theism
- Defends a singular model of the Leibnizian cosmological argument
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Extra info for Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency
In this section, I will briefly canvass the ideas of some who, while accepting that many modal statements are true, have sought either to reductively analyze modal statements in terms of the nonmodal or to deflate their ‘ideological’ or ontological commitments. Tarski Alfred Tarski’s famous paper “On the Concept of Logical Consequence” (1983 ), presented a now-standard method for defining the intuitive notions of logical consequence and logical truth. The method involves characterizing a class of set-theoretic models, or interpretations, and defining a notion of truth-in-the-model.
This would seem to lead to a muddying of logic with ubiquitous vagueness, worries about identifying the presumably nominal essential features of natural kind terms, and so on. ) Etchemendy may be supposing – his remarks on this point are unclear to me – that the nonmodal properties of the meanings or concepts expressed by the terms of a language suffice to fix the logical properties of its sentences, so that no appeal to primitive necessities is needed. If so, we would have a kind of reduction of logic after all.
To the extent that I correctly judge the content of these principles and grasp all relevant concepts, I am immediately in a position to judge the truth or falsity of specific modal statements. None of this involves positing or ‘receiving an impression of’ primitive necessity in the world. Peacocke’s Principles seek to elucidate the concept of possibility in terms of a notion of admissible assignment. , an object to a singular concept). Assignments, then, will be total specifications conforming only to broad, categorematic norms.