By Jong-Chan Rhee
The writer examines the character of Korea's `industrial miracle' and, specifically, the restrictions of its authoritarian nation as a motor vehicle for intervening available in the market or for sponsoring liberal reform.
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Relentless and ominous, the drumbeat echoes around the land: Social protection is at the verge of financial disaster. The caution has been repeated so usually that it has turn into a depressing article of religion for the hundreds of thousands of usa citizens who pay Social safeguard taxes and count on to assemble merits sometime. however it is flatly unfaithful.
Additional resources for The State and Industry in South Korea: The Limits of the Authoritarian State
In the early 1950s, the Japanese government established such public financial institutions as the Japan Development Bank and the Export and Import Bank of Japan in order to channel state funds into industrial projects favoured by the government. Under the ‘credit-based’ financial system, the securities markets did not play an important role in supplying funds for industry. Until the early 1960s, the volume of state funds had declined along with the increasing private city bank loans. These banks were also under the control of the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance: …private financial institutions were placed under the strict control of the Ministry of Finance.
Thus, the payoff order of player X against player Y is DC-CC-DD-CD (X: Y; D: defection; C: cooperation). In the deadlock game, there is also the dominant strategy of defection: both players are better off with mutual defection than with mutual cooperation. Thus, the payoff order of player X against player Y is DC-DD-CC-CD (X:Y). The cooperative game has two characteristics. First, in contrast to the prisoners’ dilemma game, cooperation is the dominant strategy for each player. Second, by choosing the dominant strategy of cooperation, players are better off than if they had chosen the strategy of defection.
These changing institutions had affected the interests and capacities of state managers and social groups. Since the beginning of the economic crisis, a small group of bureaucrats had attempted to change policy goals in order to pursue economic stabilization, whereas big businessmen, as the governing partner of the state, persisted in keeping their own privileges in the market as a result of high economic growth. The institutional capacities of the state had declined, which conditioned the policy failures of the HCIIAs.