By G. Peter Penz
This publication, released in 1986, addresses questions excited by a significant normative precept in modern checks of monetary rules and structures. What does 'consumer sovereignty' suggest? Is customer sovereignty a suitable precept for the optimization and overview of the layout and function of financial regulations, associations and structures? If no longer, what's a extra applicable precept? the writer argues that the perception of patron sovereignty should be broadened in order that it isn't restricted to the marketplace mechanism yet contains environmental, paintings and social personal tastes. notwithstanding, even this model runs into critical problems because the precept of patron sovereignty nonetheless depends on too subjectivist a perception of the pursuits of people to be appropriate for the review of monetary associations. an alternate foundation for such overview is 'human pursuits' that aren't contingent on specific monetary platforms, After contemplating a variety of chances, a basic-needs method is proposed and its use in fiscal review illustrated.
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This is a comprehensive formulation of the optimization calculus representing both the conception of distributive justice and, to the extent that it is applicable, the trade-off between distributive justice and aggregation that is to be embodied in the conception of optimality. However, such a comprehensive conception of optimality intro duces controversy about distributive justice. Welfare economists in the twentieth century have tried to sidestep this issue by isolating the facet of the optimization calculus that avoids the question of the op timal distribution, namely, efficiency.
4 The free-market-choice requirement and the core version of private sovereignty The problem and the optimization calculus The free-market-choice requirement, in fact, involves two problems. ( 1 ) To require, as part of the definition, the market mechanism for preference revelation means that the institutional methods for con trolling producer decisions are limited to the market mechanism, so that the market version of private sovereignty cannot be used to eval uate or justify the market mechanism as a system for coordinating production and distribution.
They will be referred to as wants for relativities. (3) Wants for the fulfillment of the interests of others, when combined with a willingness to sacrifice one's own in terest, are altruistic wants. (4) An individual not only may be con cerned about promoting the interests of others as they themselves see them, but may want those others to meet certain standards for rea sons that have nothing to do with his own self-interest (in any ordi nary sense of self-interest). I shall call such wants norm-imposing.